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COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS IN POST-MODERN ART
Lori Petruzzellr
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright law establishes a framework to protect artistic creation by providing
a system of economic incentives. By granting an artist property rights in her
work, the Copyright Act fosters the production of a wide array of creative works
from many different genres.' To this end, the Copyright Act does not define art,
rather it draws lines and sets forth flexible categories of works which are eligible
for protection. There are no qualitative tests, simply a low threshold of origi-
nality and a requirement that the work be an expression, not an idea.2 Even with
this broad framework and flexible approach, the Copyright Act fails to extend
protection to many movements within post-modem art.
Post-modemism rebels against the traditional norms of originality, ownership,
and expression that define copyright protection. The post-modem artist challeng-
es notions of originality by lifting images from pre-existing works to present
novel ideas about society, politics, and consumerism. Ownership is questioned by
appropriation artists who take the work of another and claim it as their own.
Artistic expression, once the essence of art, is now subservient to the artistic
idea.3 "[Post-modemism's] ... ambitions are not the ambitions of art, but those
of politics or psychology or pornography or something else."4
Some commentators believe the Copyright Act should adapt to cover forms of
art that did not exist or were in their inception at the time the Act was written.
Others argue that the Copyright Act discriminates against modem artists because
it draws lines using traditional notions of creation and originality. These people
argue that the Act must be changed or post-modemism and its wealth of socially
rewarding commentary will suffer.
This paper argues that the Copyright Act should not be changed to accommo-
date the specific problems posed by post-modem art. To do otherwise would lead
to an amorphous, unworkable scheme where potentially everything could be
* B.A. 1992, Fairfield University (Politics and Art History); J.D. 1995, Marshall-Wythe School
of Law, College of William & Mary. The author would like to thank Professor 1. Trotter Hardy for
his guidance and assistance. This work is dedicated to the memory of Rev. Christopher J. Mooney,
SJ. - jurist, teacher, friend.
I. E. Kenly Ames, Note, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for Appropriation, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1477 (1993).
2. Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy
and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. LJ. 175, 179 (1990).
3. Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies Piracy, and Post-Modernism, 11
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 1, 1 (1992).
4. JAMES GARDNER, CULTURE OR TRASH? A PROvOCATivE VIEw OF CONTEMPORARY PAINT-
ING, ScuLuruRE, AND OTHER COSTLY COMMODITIES vii (1993).
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protected art. Artistic ideas would take precedence over artistic expression, and
the wealth of creative expression that has defined our culture would suffer. Art-
ists would be able to have a monopoly on ideas that would forestall entire ave-
nues of creative expression, such as certain colors or geometric shapes. The
Copyright Act was written to minimize subjective evaluations, but to accommo-
date post-modem art, judges would have to interject their own aesthetic sensibili-
ties in determining whether an artist's idea was original.
This paper will discuss the tension between post-modem art and the Copyright
Act by discussing several cornerstones of copyright law and how they apply to
various movements within post-modem art. The low threshold of originality will
be discussed in the context of how the Act attempts to minimize bias against
modem art.
I will discuss how the current Copyright Act is workable, despite its exclusion
of much of post-modem art, by first examining the incentive structure of the
Copyright Act and how it is aimed at fostering artistic expression, not ideas. This
paper will then discuss copyright problems unique to conceptual art, such as the
tension between the idea/expression dichotomy and the movement's premium on
art as idea. Conceptual art should not receive copyright protection because the
emphasis in this movement is on new ideas, not new expression. Two artists
creating strikingly similar works are not really in competition with each other if
their ideas are distinct. There is little concern if a conceptual artist copies
another's expression, so long as the underlying idea is distinct. These artists do
not need the types of incentives that the Copyright Act offers to foster continued
creation.
Next, I will examine the problems posed by Appropriation art, a movement
which incorporates the images of others into pre-existing works to comment on
society.' Appropriation art is, in essence, infringement for a reason. Artists take
the copyrighted work of another and place it in a new context. This is a form of
art that results in some legitimate social commentary. Yet, it falls to produce
legitimate original expression, which is what the Copyright Act fosters. Proposals
to change the Copyright Act to accommodate this type of work lead to a myriad
of problems. Allowing a fair use defense to Appropriation art on a larger scale
would lead to abuse by infringers claiming artistic intent. Post-modem artists
would be infringing the works of others with abandon. What was once consid-
ered infringement would be considered protected expression.
Post-modemism does pose distinct copyright problems, but this type of art is
simply not suited for protection. If the Act were overhauled to accommodate
post-modernism's unique problems, the essence of copyright protection, the
fostering of original expression, would be seriously undermined and our national
culture would suffer.
5. Ames, supra note 1, at 1481.
[Vol. V: 115
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II. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
A. COPYRIGHT INCENTIVES: AN OVERVIEW
The overriding purpose of copyright law in the United States is to encourage
the widest possible dissemination of artistic works to the public. The Copyright
Act is based on the presumption that authors will not invest their time and mon-
ey in creating original works unless they are granted certain property rights. The
types of property rights implicated by this presumption are the author's right to
control the distribution of her work in the marketplace and the right to profit
from the use of her work in the marketplace.6
To this end, the framers of the Constitution provided that Congress should
have the power to enact a statute to grant such property rights and economic
incentives to authors.7 The Constitution provides for the enactment of a copy-
right statute "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."' Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Copy-
right Act was enacted.9 Copyright protection is extended to "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."'
'
The Copyright Act provides artists and authors with economic incentives to
create unique and original works which contribute to our cultural heritage."
Economic incentives guarantee a fair return for an author's effort in order to
increase the amount of creative work available to the public. 2 An artist should
not lose the economic return she could reasonably expect to get from her work
due to someone illegally copying her work and selling it, thus supplanting the
original artist's market. 3
Copyright law also recognizes that authors need to draw on the works of
others for inspiration. In order for our national culture to thrive, authors must be
permitted to create works which draw from their predecessors. The need of au-
thors to draw from the work of others must be balanced with the need to grant
economic incentives for original works. 4
The Copyright Act strikes a balance by focusing on protecting the copyright
6. 1 PAUL GOLDSTEN, COPYRIGHT § 1.1 (1989).
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Note that "Science" refers to the work of authors, which is the
subject of copyright protection, while "useful Arts" refers to the work of inventors, which is the
subject of patent protection.
9. The 1976 Copyright Act as amended is the present statute which provides copyright protec-
tion. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-810 (1988).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
11. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 16. The Copyright Act also promotes the dissemination of
knowledge by requiring that the owner of a copyright or of the exclusive right to publication of a
work published in the United States deposit two copies of the work for the Library of Congress. 17
U.S.C. § 407 (1988).
12. Ames, supra note 1, at 1486-1487.
13. Id. at 1515.
14. GOLDEaN, supra note 6, at § 1.1.
1995]
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holder's economic incentives for continued creation, rather than on protecting the
rights in a work from any "hint of infringement."' 5 To this end, the Copyright
Act employs a liberal fair use standard 6 that allows copying when the harm to
the market is insubstantial and outweighed by a strong public interest in fostering
works that criticize and question societal norms through commenting on the
copyrighted work of another. 7
B. COPYRIGHT INCENTIVES AND POST-MODERN ART
Despite the Copyright Act's long history and success at providing incentives
for artists and authors to create a near infinite number of creative works, these
same incentives that fostered creation in other media and movements run counter
to the underpinnings of the post-modem art movement. Copyright law has a
moral aspect that contradicts appropriation art: that a person should not take
another's work for their own financial gain. 9 This aspect of copyright law is in
conflict with the practice of post-modem artists who freely comment on copy-
righted images from the mass media that are controlled by broadcasters, publish-
ers, and motion picture conglomerates. Incentives for post-modem artists are
more political in nature than economic. The post-modem artist creates works to
challenge these powerful groups which might otherwise have monopoly control
over the communication of the very images that create our popular culture?
Because many post-modem artists appropriate the copyrighted works of others to
comment on society, much of post-modem art is not copyrightable.
Likewise, conceptual artists challenge the same powerful groups as the appro-
priation artists by redefining what is art and what are socially valuable ideas. The
conceptual artist does this by creating works that are original in idea, but not
expression.2 Such works do not get copyright protection because protection is
only extended to works that are original in execution, rather than original in
idea.22 Yet, post-modem art continues to thrive, even though it does not benefit
from the incentives of the Copyright Act. If post-modem art continues to thrive
without economic incentives, extending copyright protection to post-modem art
may not be necessary.
15. Ames, supra note 1, at 1477.
16. See infra note 164.
17. Ames, supra note 1, at 1477.
18. Appropriation art is a movement within post-modernism that lifts images from the mass me-
dia, sometimes in their entirety, to comment not only on the image itself, but on the consumerism of
a mass media society. Id. at 1487; see also infra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
19. Timothy Cone, Fair Use? Rogers v. Koons, ARTS MAG., December 1991, at 25, 26.
20. Id.
21. Roberta Smith, Conceptual Art, in CONCEPTS OF MODERN ART, 256, 260 (Nikos Stangos ed.
1981).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
[Vol. V: 115
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Ill. ORIGINALITY REQUIREMENT
A. PROTECTION OF ORIGINAL EXPRESSION, NOT IDEAS
Post-modernism not only runs counter to the incentive structure of the Copy-
right Act, but to its minimum requirements that a work be original in expression.
Within post-modem art is the conceptual art movement which challenges notions
of creativity by embracing the idea as art, rather than the execution.' This en-
tire movement challenges the underpinnings of copyright law: the notions of
originality and expression versus idea. The notion that art does not need to have
any form at all so long as the artist has a mental conception is a total rejection
of copyright's notion that a line can be drawn between idea and expression.24
"Idea" refers to a work's animating concept, such as a story of two star-
crossed lovers, while "expression" refers to the ultimate, literal expression, such
as the play that tells the story of the two lovers.' Courts will look at a creation
and separate the idea, the unprotected part of a work, from its expression, the
protected part of the work. 6 This separation represents an important policy de-
cision of what parts of a work authors should be allowed to monopolize and
what parts belong in the public domain, so others are free to build on them. 7
B. FEIST FORMULATION OF ORIGINALTY
Copyright's formulation of originality lies at the heart of the Act as does the
separation of idea from expression. Examining the basis for originality demon-
strates how the Act goes about classifying what types of works are worthy of
protection. This formulation is purposefully broad so that aesthetic judgments are
kept to an absolute minimum. Even with this broad definition, many works of
post-modem art which stress original ideas rather than original expression fail to
qualify for copyright protection.
"The sine qua non of copyright is originality."'  The leading case on
copyright's originality standard is Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.' The court in Feist articulated the standard for originality, not ex-
plicitly, but by default." This reluctancy to define originality without any exac-
titude reflects the ambiguity and subjective nature of that concept.
The threshold for originality is that the work must be the original of the au-
thor, as opposed to being work appropriated from another. The artist's personal
23. See Smith, supra note 21, at 257.
24. Id
25. GOLDSEIN, supra note 6, at § 2.3.1.
26. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding that the copyright of an accounting book
extended only to the words describing the method, and not the method itself).
27. GOLDSTmN, supra note 6, at § 2.3.
28. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (1992)
(holding that arrangement of listings in white pages was not original expression).
29. Id.
30. Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801, 823 (1993).
1995]
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contribution to the work is what is considered to be original.3 This poses a
problem for appropriation artists who lift the images of others, sometimes in
their entirety, and incorporate them into their work. In addition to this require-
ment of independent creation, the court in Feist also noted that the work must
embody some minimal degree of creativity. All that is needed is "some creative
spark, no matter how crude, humble or obvious."32 By keeping the threshold so
low, the Copyright Act minimizes the danger of the judiciary interjecting their
own notions of what is or is not art.33 As long as the work in question meets
the low requisite level of creativity, the work gets copyright protection, regard-
less of how slight the creative spark might be that illuminates the entire piece.
Nonetheless, in Feist, the arrangement of listings in Rural's white pages failed to
meet even this minimum standard.34 The court found that the arrangement of
these listings "could not be more obvious and lacks the modicum of creativity
necessary to transform mere selection into copyrightable expression."35 The
court went on to state that such an arrangement was an "age-old practice, firmly
rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a
matter of course."'36 Such an arrangement would, therefore, be denied copyright
protection. Thus, as a pre-requisite for copyright protection, originality has a very
low threshold that extends protection to a wide variety of creative expression,
regardless of the subjective value of the work. Nevertheless, some works of post-
modem art do not even have this requisite level of creativity because they focus
on original ideas, rather than original expression. Other works fail to receive
protection because they are not the independent creation of the artist, but rather
are the appropriated work of someone else.
C. NOVELTY VERSUS ORIGINALITY
In order to make copyright protection available to the widest number of works
possible, copyright law uses a standard for originality that is distinct from the
novelty requirement in patents. 7 The introduction of new techniques and styles
to the world of art is truly creative in that it is novel. Although a novel work of
art would also be considered original under the Copyright Act, a work need not
be novel to still receive copyright protection.35 Like the author's combination of
31. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1287.
32. Id.
33. Cohen, supra note 2, at 230.
34. Feist, 111 S. Ct. 1282.
35. Id. at 1285.
36. Id. Many works of post-modem art, especially minimalist works, fit this description. Think of
Malevich's White on White. Although the concept of embracing the canvas as simply a picture plane,
rather than a window onto the world was creative in concept, the end product of a white square on a
white canvas was commonplace. Under Feist's analysis, the simplistic execution of painting a white
square can easily be viewed as so rooted in tradition as to lack the requisite creative spark.
37. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at § 2.2.1.1 (1989).
38. Probably Judge Learned Hand's example of an author independently writing a poem that
turns out to be line for line identical to Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn is the best example of the dis-
tinction between novelty and originality for copyright purposes. As long as the second author can
[Vol. V: 115
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pre-existing words and letters to create a literary work, so does the artist trans-
form pre-existing elements of color, shape, tone, and dimension to create a new
work.39 In this way, if a successor of Rembrandt were to incorporate his novel
variations of light and color into a painting of his own independent creation, the
successor's painting would have the requisite degree of originality, even though
the techniques and style utilized were not unique to the successor artist.
Congress chose the lower standard of originality for the Copyright Act, as
opposed to novelty, in order to provide protection and incentives to the broadest
class of works possible. It did this by not confining the standard for originality to
anything but the lowest requisite threshold. In this way, the Copyright Act tries
to protect as many different genres of art as it possibly can while still making
protection meaningful by not extending protection to absolutely everything.'
IV. TENSION BETWEEN COPYRIGHT LAW AND CONCEPTUAL ART
A. LACK OF ORIGINAL EXPRESsIoN
Fulfilling the requirement of originality for copyright protection is difficult for
the conceptual artist because creativity for them lies in the idea, not in the ex-
pression.4' In conceptual art, language and ideas are the true essence of art, not
the visual or sensory experience.42 Artist Douglas Huebler summarized the spirit
of the movement when he stated that all art activity is a process of conceptual
documentation, and it is ideas that remain once the creative process has ended.43
The Dada movement was the precursor to contemporary conceptual art."4
According to Marcel Duchamp, the artist who is considered the founder of the
Dada movement, art had more to do with the artist's intentions than with any
creative act or aesthetic expression. To Duchamp, art was idea.4' As such, the
materials of the conceptual artist are as infinite as the amount of ideas and
interpretations.'
The work of German artist Hans Haacke is a prime example of art as idea,
not expression. Haacke's work, entitled Manet Project, consists of panels that list
prove that he had not copied Keats's poem, meaning that the second poem was the independent cre-
ation of the second author, the poem would meet the originality requirement Nevertheless, the sec-
ond author would have a most difficult time proving that the similarities were due to some freak
coincidence. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 669 (1936).
39. VerSteeg, supra note 30, at 816.
40. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1988).
41. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 14.
42. Smith, supra note 23, at 260.
43. Robert C. Morgan, Word, Document, Installation: Recent Developments in Conceptual Art,
ARTS MAG., May 1991, at 65, 69.
44. See infra notes 85-88, 122-123 and accompanying text.
45. Smith, supra note 21, at 257.
46. Robert C. Morgan, Idea, Concept, System, ARTS MAG., September 1989, at 61, 62.
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the names of all the people who bought and sold Manet's Bunch of Asparagus
from 1880 until the Wallraf-Richartz Museum in Cologne acquired that painting.
His work's importance rests not in the visual effect or aesthetic qualifies of the
letters on the panels, but in questioning the association of business transactions
with the art world.47
Art as idea is also a powerful tool of political conceptual art. Jenny Holzer is
a conceptual artist known for her "Truisms" or aphorisms of powerful words. In
1982, Holzer flashed messages on the electronic board in Times Square that
read, "Property Created Crime" and "Torture is Barbaric."' Her work has also
been exhibited in the Guggenheim in the form of provocative messages commu-
nicated in light.49 Like Haacke, the importance of Holzer's work lies in the
message she is communicating, and not in the visual effects of colored light.
An artist's lack of creative intent in producing a work can not nullify the
originality of a work.50 However, an artist's creative intent alone does not make
a work original because copyrightability turns on the originality of the artistic
expression, not on the originality of the artistic idea.5'
Nevertheless, some conceptual works such as minimalist works, are only
creative in their conception, rather than in their execution. Minimalists believe
that art is a vehicle for imposing order on things, rather than a mode of self-
expression.52 A minimalist work such as Malevich's White on White is a prime
example of the tension between a creative concept and a commonplace execu-
tion.53 Malevich expressed the creative idea of absolute artistic purity by paint-
ing the simplest thing one could possibly paint: a monochromatic white can-
vas.54 Yet, this painted white canvas was not much different in appearance than
the white canvas artists begin with before applying any paint.
The nature of abstract art simply does not lend itself to a wealth of creative
expression. Some critics believe that we may soon reach a point where very few
variations on abstraction will have remained unclaimed. Art critic James Gardner
writes that it is now a miracle when a contemporary artist makes a truly original
abstraction.5 Likewise, Thomas Lawson writes that the "deliberate sparseness"
of minimalism and abstraction have become "worn through overuse."
In the Whitney Biennial, for example, post-modern artists, like Dawn Fryling,
appropriated elements in their art that have been used many times before. Fryling
used the tradition of light shows and theatrical sets from the work of Robert
Mangold and Allan McCollum in her room of empty picture frames and halide
47. ROBERT PELFREY & MARY HALL-PELFREY, ART AND MASS MEDIA 323 (1985).
48. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 165.
49. Id.
50. VerSteeg, supra note 30, at 845.
51. See id.
52. Suzi Gablik, Minimalism, in CONCEPTS OF MODERN ART 244, 245 (Nikos Stangos ed. 1981).
53. See discussion, supra note 36.
54. PELFREY, supra note 47, at 239.
55. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 131.
56. Thomas Lawson, Last Exit: Painting, in AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING REPRESENTATION
153, 154 (Brian Wallis ed. 1984).
[Vol. V:l115
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lights. 7 Another example of what critics consider to be the death throes of cre-
ative conceptual art can be observed in Christian Marclay's Tape Fall. The Tape
Fall consisted of a tape reel in a stairway, spewing tape off one reel into a pile
of discarded tape, while the sound of waves echoed in the background. Thomas
McEvilley, in his review of Marclay's work in the WHrrNEY BIENNIAL, noted
that a "troubling similar" piece was done by William Anastasi in 1965!'
Marclay may not have known about the previous work, but "the conceptual
vocabulary, like painting before it, is getting cramped and going around in circles
a bit."59
As such, the problem of this type of art meeting copyright's originality re-
quirement may be rooted in the nature of the movement and not in the short-
comings of the law. The copyright law should not have to accommodate art
movements that are premised on notions that run counter to traditional views of
art. If the copyright law were to accommodate each new movement, virtually
everything would receive protection, idea and expression, and it would lead to
the death of copyright protection and the incentive system as we know it.
For example, to accommodate minimalist Art, copyright protection would
have to be extended to works that are so simplistic that the idea merges with the
expression. This could lead to one artist holding a monopoly on the color blue, if
the work in question consisted of nothing more than a blue panel.
Because copyright protection is currently only extended to works of original
expression, copyright protection would have to be extended to original ideas, as
well as expression, to accommodate conceptual art. Under such a system every-
thing could be potentially copyrightable art, as long as the conception were orig-
inal. This could lead to some ridiculous results. Consider the work of perfor-
mance artist Chris Burden. In Burden's work Gargon! the artist did nothing more
than serve coffee to hundreds of gallery patrons. The cream pitcher he used was
later encased in glass and sold for $24,000 as a work of art.' If copyright pro-
tection were extended to original ideas, others would be forestalled from serving
coffee if they exhibited a motivation similar to Burden's. Producers of cream
pitchers may be threatened with an infringement action if a pitcher of theirs was
used for a similar purpose. There would also be the administrative problem of
registering ideas and proving that what someone claims to be their idea is a bona
fide conception and not a ploy to escape infringement.
B. TENSION BETWEEN THE IDEAJEXPRESSION DICHOTOMY AND CONCEPTUAL
CREATIVTY
Professor Amy Cohen of Western New England College of Law believes that
the copyright law should change to accommodate non-traditional art movements.
57. Thomas McEvilley, Two Big Shows: Post-Modernism and Its Discontents, ARTFORuM, Sum-
mer 1991, at 98, 100.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 3.
9
Petruzzelli: Copyright Problems in Post-Modern Art
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW
Cohen writes that if value is placed on the creative process in conceptual art,
then copyright's focus on the end product seems misplaced."'
To the extent that copyright law rests on the view that the government should
prohibit copying of expression in order to protect the original artist but allow
the copying of ideas in order to encourage the creation of new works, it may be
missing the point. There may be no way for the new artist to extract the 'idea'
without the 'expression' of it, and moreover, there may be no point in making
that artist attempt to do so because that artist's creation of his or her work may
be considered valuable as a reflection of that artist and that artist's definition of
what is art.
62
What Professor Cohen is doing is recognizing the tension between the
idea/expression dichotomy and notions of creativity in contemporary art.63 Be-
cause there may be no way to extract the idea from the expression in many
contemporary art forms, whole movements will be denied copyright protec-
tion.' Some may argue that this lack of copyright protection has led to the lack
of creativity in minimalist and conceptual art.' Yet, this position is question-
able. The essence of minimalist art is the conception behind the work. It is not in
the nature of the work to strive for different forms of expression, rather artists
strive for original conceptions behind similar works. While the work of Mark
Rothko and Barnett Newman appear similar in their handling of sheets of color,
what sets them apart from each other is their thought and emotion.' The artist's
thought and emotion behind a minimalist work is what makes that work distinc-
tive, setting it apart from other similar works. The economic incentives for mini-
malist art are different than the incentives associated with other genres. The
market for a Rothko painting is defined by the artist's personality, not by the
aesthetic qualities of his work. One wants a Rothko not because there is no other
blue rectangle quite like it, but because his personality was behind the creation.
His blue rectangle supposedly conveys his outlook on art to the viewer in a way
that no other blue rectangle can. Although the Copyright Act provides incentives
for works that would not otherwise be made, conceptual artists continue to create
and sell their work without copyright protection and its economic incentives.
C. MINIMALIST ART AND THE MERGER DOCTRINE
Roman Opalka's work is an interesting example of Minimalist art which is
original in idea but not in expression. His life's work is painting sequences of
numbers on black canvas with white paint. He reduces the tone of the black
background by one percent and estimates by the time he is seventy, his works
61. Cohen, supra note 2, at 231.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 208.
64. See id. at 231.
65. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
66. CARLA GOTrTLEB, BEYOND MODERN ART 80-81 (1976). Rothko painted monochromatic
canvases for clarity, the elimination of obstacles between the painter and the idea, while Barnett
painted his monochromatic canvases as a personal approach to mysticism and religion.
[Vol. V: 115
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will be white on white.67 Opalka's idea is original, but his end product of an all
white canvas will be the same in expression as Malevich's WHITE ON WHITE.
Even if Malevich never painted WHITE ON WHITE, Opalka's work would not
receive copyright protection because an all white canvas embodies the merger
doctrine. Where a work's underlying expression can only be expressed in one
way, a court will withhold copyright protection even if there is some original
expression.' Using the example of Malevich's WHITE ON WHITE, there is no
other way to express the idea of a white square than to paint a white square. To
grant copyright protection to the white square would confer a monopoly of the
white square on one artist. This result would be disastrous to creativity in gener-
al. Any work containing a white square could potentially be infringing, from a
folk art quilt with white patches to a representational painting depicting a white
window.
The general rule is that if there is more than one way to express something, a
court will grant copyright protection even if the expression is closely circum-
scribed by the idea.' In the case of the white square, although one can vary the
medium, there is essentially no other way to express a white square. Even if the
monopoly was confined to the original medium of paint on canvas, the creative
avenues of one entire medium would be stifled. This may encourage artists to
abandon a medium once the basic creative ingredients of shapes, colors, and
dimensions are claimed by other artists. This would undermine the incentive
structure of the Copyright Act, and would stifle the creation of new works of art.
D. UNINTENTIONAL BIAS AGAINST MINIMAIST ART
In separating what is idea from what is expression, courts will examine the
work that has been copied. The court will consider if the nature of the subject
matter dictates the way the artist renders the subject. When a court determines
how much of the expression is dictated by the design, assessments of the fact
finder's conception of aesthetics is sometimes influential.7" It is easiest for the
fact finder to separate expression from idea when the first work is rich in details
(not dictated by the basic idea) and the second work has not copied these de-
tails.7 This scheme is biased against minimalist art, which is usually devoid of
all detail. However, this result does not spring from intentional bias in the Copy-
right Act against minimalist art. One must consider the nature of minimalist art
and how its emphasis on ideas rather than expression would not be advanced
through copyright protection, which provides incentives for new forms of expres-
sion. At the worst, copyright protection would forestall all artists from using the
simple forms of abstraction such as geometric shapes and primary colors. This
67. Robert C. Morgan, Idea, Concept, System, ARTS MAG., September 1989, at 61, 65.
68. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at § 2.3.2.
69. Id.
70. Cohen, supra note 2, at 212.
71. Id. at 219.
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would deny artists the use of the very building blocks of their profession."
V. DERIVATIVE WoRKS' FORMULATION OF ORIGINALITY
A. INFRINGEMENT BY POST-MODERN DERIVATIVE WORKS
Much of post-modem art consists of what in copyright terminology is called
derivative works. A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more pre-
existing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction.., or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted .... "'
When an artist makes a derivative work, he borrows from, transforms, or
appropriates a pre-existing work in order to make his creation. However, the
copyright owner has the exclusive right to prepare such derivative works.74
Post-modem artists frequently infringe copyrights when they use their work to
comment on contemporary images that have not yet fallen into the public domain
or when they fail to pay licensing fees. Such works infringe the underlying work,
regardless of the degree of transformation or creativity the derivative artist has
breathed into the secondary work.75 No matter how creative the post-modem
artist's transformation of the underlying work may be, he must not trammel on
the property rights that the original artist has in her work. If the post-modem
artist were allowed to create derivative works without the permission of the
copyright holder, it would completely undermine the incentive structure of the
Copyright Act. Thus, when post-modem artists who appropriate from others in
creating derivative works are found guilty of infringement, it is not because of a
judicial bias against modem art, but because of the basic principles of copyright
law, that one may not steal the copyrighted work of another for their own bene-
fit.
76
B. DISTINGUISHABLE VARIATION TEST
Even if a post-modem artist borrows from the public domain, transforms a
work which she has the copyright to, or pays a licensing fee, if the derivative
artist wishes to receive copyright protection, the work must still meet copyright's
originality requirement. Originality in a derivative work requires that the author
contribute "something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recog-
nizably 'his own.' No matter how poor artistically the 'author's' addition, it is
enough if it be his own." Thus, two requirements for originality must be met
if the derivative work is to receive copyright protection: the derivative work must
72. See GoLs'rETN, supra note 6, at § 2.3.2.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
74. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1988).
75. Jeff Koons's String of Puppies is probably the most infamous derivative work of late. See
infra notes 161-177 and accompanying test.
76. See Cone, supra note 19, at 26.
77. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951).
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borrow the original expression from an underlying work and the new work must
be a transformation of the underlying work, not simply a copy. Courts apply the
same standard of originality to derivative works as they do to copyright subject
matter in general. Nevertheless, courts tend to merge the two requirements for
originality into the single standard that a derivative work must contain "distin-
guishable, nontrivial variation from the underlying work."'78 In Alfred Bell, for
example, the artist transformed works in the public domain by old masters into
mezzotint engravings. The etched reproductions differed from the original oil
paintings because the engraver used lines and dots to create light and shade. This
is distinguishable from the use of brush strokes and color by the old master to
produce light and shade in the original work.79 The court held that these repro-
ductions were enough of a deviation from the underlying work to meet the origi-
nality standard.83
As with non-derivative works, the distinguishable variation of a derivative
work need not be intentional.8' As Judge Frank stated in Alfred Bell, "[a]
copyist's bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of
thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a
variation unintentionally, the 'author' may adopt it as his own and copyright
it.,,8
Nevertheless, some derivative works by post-modem artists do not fulfill the
distinguishable variation requirement. If someone were to copy the work of these
artists, the post-modem artist would have no recourse under the Copyright Act
since the derivative work fails to fulfill the low threshold of originality that is
required for copyright protection. For example, the distinguishable variation stan-
dard for derivative works operates to exclude the whole movement of Super
Realism from copyright protection. Super Realism appropriates images from
photographs and replicates them exactly in paint or a similar medium." The
whole point of Super Realism is that there is no deviation from the original,
underlying work. 4 If the work of this movement is not protected, one must ask
if there will be any incentives to create this type of art. Is this type of art not
protected because it is not the type of expression that Congress believes will
benefit the public? The answer is that this type of art does not produce anything
new to our culture by way of expression. Some may argue that the originality
standard for derivative works must be reformulated so as to not arbitrarily dis-
criminate against post-modem art. Nevertheless, the Copyright Act does not
78. GOLDS'EIN, supra note 6, at § 2.16.2.
79. See Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 104-105, n.22.
80. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d 99.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 105.
83. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 13. An example of a Super Realism, also called Photo Realism, is
the work of Chuck Close. Close makes paintings of his friends' faces from photographs using an
elaborate grid system to guarantee photographic exactitude. Close breaks down his strokes into min-
ute dots within the grid system so there is no signature style, only the photographic image. PELFREY,
supra note 47, at 292.
84. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 13.
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arbitrarily discriminate against post-modem derivative works. The low threshold
requirement of originality excludes some movements within post-modernism, but
not all movements. Some movements within post-modernism do produce works
containing some low level of original expression. These works do receive copy-
right protection because they contain original expression. Congress believes that
the dissemination of such works containing some level of original expression will
be beneficial to the public in that they add to our cultural vocabulary.
C. RATIONALE OF DISTINGUISHABLE VARIATION STANDARD
To demonstrate how the distinguishable variation standard of originality does
not operate to arbitrarily discriminate against post-modem art, it may be helpful
to consider what a court would do if Marcel Duchamp tried to register his copy
of Mona Lisa with a mustache and beard, entitled L.H.O.O.Q.5 The judge
would first separate the underlying work from the work in question. The con-
ceptual components would be isolated. 6 Leonardo da Vinci's Mona Lisa would
be separated from what Duchamp added to the work (the mustache, beard, and
initials). The judge would then consider the number of variations in the work,
keeping in mind that the variations in a work should be considered trivial only
when they are very small in number.8 7 The addition of the penciled in mus-
tache, beard, and the letters L.H.O.O.Q. are simply not be enough of a variation
to overcome the "merely trivial"8" threshold of Alfred Bell. Alternatively, when
Andy Warhol silkscreened Leonardo's Mona Lisa onto a stretched canvas and
painted the silkscreen in his signature primary colors, Warhol's variations would
be considered enough to give him a copyright in the derivative work.
Duchamp's work simply does not have enough original components to be
worthy of protection. The court uses an objective originality standard. Their
decision not to extend protection to Duchamp's work has nothing to do with the
subject matter the recontextualization of an icon of art history into a mockery of
art. Andy Warhol's work does basically the same thing as Duchamp's. Warhol
challenges the meaning of the Mona Lisa in the art history continuum by mass
producing the image in the bright colors of Madison Avenue advertising agen-
cies. Yet, unlike Duchamp, Warhol conveys his message by making enough
variations from the original work, that his work actually adds something new to
our visual vocabulary. The purpose of the Copyright Act is to encourage the
production of original works. Duchamp's work simply does not contain enough
deviations from the original so as to classify it as an original derivative work.
Thus, derivative post-modem works of art are given the same consideration as
works from other movements- an objective examination of the distinguishable
85. L.H.O.O.Q. reads phonetically in French: "She's got hot pants" or "Her arse is itching." Mar-
cel Duchanp, L.H.O.O.Q. 1919. Corrected Readymade, print and pencil. 7 1/2" x 5". Private Collec-
tion, Paris. GoTLIEB, supra note 66, at 103.
86. VerSteeg, supra note 30, at 848.
87. Id. at 854.
88. Alfred Bell, 191 F. 2d at 103.
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variations from the original.
VI. DEFINING ART
A. AVANT-GARDE REFORMULATION OF ART
One must examine the non-traditional way in which post-modemism defines
art in order to understand how unworkable the Copyright Act would be if it were
overhauled to accommodate post-modem art. Some may argue that the copyright
requirement of originality suppresses the avant-garde by denying protection to
those works which push the envelope of what is considered art. Yet, the whole
point of post-modernism is to question the meaning of art. Post-modernists do
not need the economic incentives of the Copyright Act to inspire works that
question the traditional definitions of art. All they need as inspiration is a tradi-
tional definition to defy. The Copyright Act provides such a traditional definition
in that it extends protection to works which are traditionally regarded as art. If a
work is original in its execution and is in a fixed tangible medium, it will receive
copyright protection.' If works from movements such as Super Realism fell
under the protection of the Copyright Act, it would be because those works had
the requisite amount of creativity or originality. If copyright protection were ex-
tended to such a work, it would mean that the work fell within the traditional
definitions of art. Thus, if a post-modem work receives copyright protection, the
artist has failed in his attempt to redefine and challenge the traditional definitions
of art. His work has failed to fulfill the mission of post-modernism: to redefine
art. Works that push the envelope of originality must fall outside the scope of
copyright protection because the Copyright Act provides the standard for origi-
nality against which the post-modem artist rebels.
Indeed, a major goal of post-modem art is to obscure "the boundaries and
logic of inherited artistic ideas and materials, including the inheritance of Mod-
ernism."' Post-modem art challenges the traditional definitions of art by em-
bracing new media, escaping the confines of the canvas and the gallery, which
were still trappings of the Modernism of Picasso and Miro. To this end, post-
modem art departs from painting as the pre-eminent vehicle of artistic expres-
sion.' Today, art can be anything. The artist, Christo, for example, wrapped
two and a half miles of Australian coastline in fabric. Christo considers the act
of uniting zoning boards, landowners, the press, the ocean, and land as much a
part of his art as was the coastline, enveloped in yards of fabric.93 In this way,
Christo tried to escape the confines of traditional art, where the gallery is the
center of gravity.
Christo's work is also an attempt at escaping the "rectangle." The rectangle
refers to the physical picture plane of a painting. Renaissance master Leon
89. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 7.
90. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
91. PELFREY, supra note 47, at 318.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 332.
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Battista Alberti was the first artist to articulate this idea by explaining that the
rectangle surface of the painting serves as an open window through which the
painted subject is viewed.94 Christo escapes the rectangle of the canvas, the
rectangle of the gallery space, and the rectangle of the window to the world.
Instead of a viewing a subject through a window, Christo takes the viewer out-
doors, to the subject itself. If the copyright law evolved to extend copyright
protection to this art event, it would mean that the definition of traditional art
would be extended to embrace the art event. The art event would be part of what
is established art and would no longer be considered avant garde. The art event
would no longer be a form of artistic rebellion. The post-modem artist would be
forced to rebel against this definitional assimilation into the Copyright Act in the
same way he has struggled against the confines of the rectangle. The post-mod-
em artist would then attempt to blur the lines of what is a copyrighted art event
in order to fulfill the post-modernist goal of confounding inherited ideas of what
defines traditional artistic expression. Post-modem art resists embracing a defini-
tion of art, while copyright laws imposes a definition of art. These two conflict-
ing goals can not readily co-exist.
B. TENSION BETWEEN CLASSICAL AND ROMANTIC VIEW OF ART
As post-modem artists redefine art in ways that run counter to copyright's
definition of art, so do they also redefine the way in which art should be evalu-
ated. The post-modem view of artistic judgment runs counter to the underpin-
nings of the Copyright Act. Post-modernists think art should be subjectively
evaluated. Yet, the Copyright Act is based on objective evaluation so as to mini-
mize bias against new art forms that may result from the subjective approach. In
this way, the Copyright Act actually protects modem art forms from intentional
bias.
The definition of art has evolved over the years from the early 19th and late
18th century Classical view of art, which is based on accuracy and imitation, to
the Romantic view, based on art as a form of self-expression reflecting the spirit
of the artist, which developed in the 19th century and extends into contemporary
times.95 These different conceptions of art pose distinct problems in the area of
post-modem art. Post-modem art, unlike classical art, has collapsed the bound-
aries between high and low art and between different genres.' Post-modem art
rejects the classical definition of art and the view that art can be evaluated objec-
tively. 97
In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,95 Justice Holmes articulated the
94. JOSEPH MASHECK, MODERNTrS: ART-MATrERS IN THE PRESENT 16 (1993).
95. Id. at 184-186.
96. Consider the work of Keith Haring which once adorned the walls of subway stations in New
York City. His graffiti moved from the streets and playgrounds of New York to the walls of private
galleries in SoHo.
97. Cohen, supra note 2, at 193.
98. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
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opposing view, that there should be an objective basis for evaluating art.
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to con-
stitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of
the narrowest and most obvious limits. At one extreme, some works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation. Their novelty would make them repulsive
until the public had learned the new language in which their author
spoke .... At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures that ap-
pealed to a public less educated than the judge.9
As Justice Holmes warned against art being subjectively evaluated, art critics
such as John Dewey urge us to value art for the creative experience behind it
and for what the work conveys to us about that experience. Dewey admonishes
the viewer not to judge art based on its conformity to objective criteria but rather
judge it on purely subjective grounds."
The post-modem conception of how art should be judged is directly at odds
with how art is evaluated under the copyright law. If post-modem art were
judged in the manner art critics urge, it would lead to the type of judicial pro-
nouncements and aesthetic discrimination that Justice Holmes believed had no
place in copyright consideration.
Under the subjective approach to evaluating art, an individual's cultural back-
ground and identity would be instrumental in determining what is valuable art,
deserving protection.'0° Thus, a representational work of traditional fine art may
receive greater protection than a non-representational work, depicting controver-
sial subject matter. A judge may view the controversial subject matter as not
contributing anything valuable to our cultural artistic experience. Under this
system of evaluation, even a work which fulfills the objective criteria of original-
ity may fail to receive protection if the work does not communicate the experi-
ence of creation in a way that appeals to the finder of fact. The subjective evalu-
ation of art would, therefore, lead to unfairness and judicial bias against certain
types of art, especially post-modem art.
C. COPYRIGHT AcT's MINIMAL ASSESSMENT OF ARTISTIC MERIT
The Copyright Act does not deny protection to certain post-modem works
because of an inherent bias against post-modemism. Post-modem works are not
denied protection because they sometimes lack beauty or skill. The Copyright
Act is structured so that protection is granted with minimal assessment of artistic
value. This is distinguishable from the way Congress considers art in other con-
texts. By comparing the neutral requirements of the Copyright Act with the sub-
jective evaluations required in other areas of the law, one can see how the Act
strives to be unbiased in its artistic valuations. When bias results under this sys-
tem it is not from the way the Act is structured, but from the way the judiciary
99. Id. at 251.
100. Cohen, supra note 2, at 191.
101. Id. at 192.
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interprets the Act.
Because it would be unwise for judges to interject their own personal tastes
into the decision-making process, Congress has tried to structure copyright law
so that the role of assessing artistic value will be minimal. 2 Copyright protec-
tion without regard to artistic value is reflected in three aspects of current copy-
right law: the liberal definition of works eligible for protection, lack of any sub-
stantive evaluation of the merits of a work, and provisions for statutory damages
even if a work has no proven economic value."0 3
Copyright law does not define art as do many other areas of the law."°
Copyright law has been structured to avoid the types of aesthetic value judg-
ments that were present in the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) funding
controversy over the homo-erotic photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe and Piss
Christ, a photograph of a crucifix in a glass of urine by Andres Serrano.'"
Through an amendment by Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, the govern-
ment determines what is socially valuable art. The NEA denies funding to works
"considered obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism,
homo-eroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex
acts and which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value."'" Unlike the Copyright Act, the NEA requires a
subjective evaluation of what is worthy of protection. The Copyright Act does
not focus on the content of the work, but rather the form. The same works which
are denied NEA funding could still be copyrightable as long as they fulfill the
requirement of an "original work of authorship in any fixed tangible medium of
expression."'"
Copyright law is also distinguishable from customs law which once defined
art by the professional status of the creator."M In addition, copyright law does
102. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). The Copyright Act sets forth broad categories of works that are
eligible for copyright protection, whose liberal definition is supported by the legislative history of this
section. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976) ("Mhe list sets out the general area of
copyrightable subject matter, but with sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or outmoded
concepts of the scope of particular categories.'); see also House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S.
Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, pt. 6, at 3 (Comm. Print May, 1965). The word "creative" was
introduced to modify the word "original" in the phrase "original works of authorship". "Creative"
was dropped because Congress believed it was subject to too many different interpretations.
103. Cohen, supra note 2, at 179.
104. But see Visual Artists Rights Act, Pub.L. No. 101-650, Tit. VI, § 610, 104 Stat. 5128 (Dec. 1,
1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 note). The Visual Artists Rights Act does define what
a visual work of art is. Yet, it does not define art per se. This section serves to afford greater protec-
tion to certain copyrighted works. It does not deny copyright protection to works that do not fall
within the definition. It simply extends more protection to those works that are identified. This sec-
tion defines the medium which is given this additional protection, rather than establishing any quali-
tative requirements.
105. Cohen, supra note 2, at 175.
106. Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEwS
(103 Stat.) 741 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 954).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
108. UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED STATES
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not define art as do various moral rights statutes do. The California moral rights
statute is an example of a limited definition of fine art. Protected art is limited to
fine art, defined as original painting, sculpture, or drawing of a recognized quali-
ty.
1 09
Because of the way the Copyright Act is structured, judges should not inter-
ject their own aesthetic judgments into copyright decisions outside of the nar-
rowest of limits."0 Even though copyright protection is usually granted without
regard to the artistic value of a work, judges do tend to rely on the artistic merit
of a work in infringement cases. This is not a reflection of a problem inherent in
the Copyright Act, but rather a reflection of the finder of fact's failure to cor-
rectly apply the law.
In Edwards v. Ruffner,"' for example, the court considered two photographs
of a dancer's lower legs and feet posed in ballet's fifth position. The court held
that the defendant's photograph did not infringe the plaintiff's work because the
models were in different attire and the photographs were taken at different an-
gles."' Although the court found the idea of a ballet dancer in fifth position
separable from the expression of the photograph, it could have held that the idea
of a dancer in fifth position merged with the expression, and was therefore
uncopyrightable. Undoubtedly, the court's assessment of the artistic value of this
work was influenced by how the court regarded ballet and photography in gen-
eral. These types of personal considerations affected how broadly the court was
willing to define the unprotected idea in this case."'
Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winniger"4 is another example of a court considering
the aesthetic value of a work in its determination of infringement. In Alva the
court held that an exact replica of Rodin's Hand of God fulfilled copyright's
originality standard even though there was no distinguishable variation from the
original, except for the difference in size. Nevertheless, the court held that the
skill and exactitude involved in the creation of the copy reflected sufficient artis-
tic judgment and skill to render this work copyrightable." 5 Yet, compare this
outcome to L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder,"6 where the court denied protec-
tion to the plaintiff's plastic copy of a cast-iron bank in the public domain. The
court held that the plastic bank exhibited only trivial variations from the original
and did not display the exactitude and faithful reproduction of the copy in
Alva."7 Furthermore, the court applied a "substantial deviation" standard, as
opposed to the less demanding "distinguishable variation" standard."' The way
ANN., sched. 7, pt. 11, US1TC Pub. 1910 (1987).
109. E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1990).
110. Bleistein V. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
111. Edwards v. Ruffner, 623 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
112. Id.
113. Cohen, supra note 2, at 216-217.
114. Alva Studios v. Winniger, 277 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
115. Id.
116. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 490.
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that these two courts shaped the originality standard to reflect the individual
outcomes reflects the judges' aesthetic judgments in that the traditional work of
fine art (the copy of Rodin's Hand of God) was granted protection, while a
cheap plastic copy of an obscure bank was denied protection. These cases dem-
onstrate how a judge's prejudices can affect the outcome of a case, regardless of
how the Copyright Act is structured. If judges were to interpret the Act in the
way it was meant to be understood, subjective evaluations of artistic merit would
have no place in evaluating the copyrightability of a work.
VII. OVERVIEW OF POST-MODERN ART
We now know that post-modem art redefines and challenges traditional defi-
nitions of art. It is important to understand why post-modem art does this. Such
an understanding will help to explain why it would be unwise for the Copyright
Act to accommodate post-modernism. "[P]ost-modernis[m] ... critiques the very
attributes that copyright law uses to define art: namely, artistic creativity and
originality.""' 9 There is no predominant trend in post-modernism, rather there
are different movements which use different elements of the modernist tradition.
The fragmentation of post-modem art is a reflection of the "glut of images and
confrontation of images taken straight from advertising media, television, film,
and 'high' art... [that] are direct reflections of the contemporary experi-
ence." 2 Via a plethora of creative avenues, the post-modem artist questions
the way society sees certain images by challenging the meaning society assigns
to such images.' An example of assigning new meaning to an old image is
Duchamp's L.H.O.O.Q."' By defacing the Mona Lisa, Duchamp gave new
meaning to this seminal piece of renaissance artistry. He challenged the viewer
to consider the work in a new, debased context, that mocked art history and the
icons of classical art.123
A more contemporary example of questioning society by assigning new
meaning to icons of popular culture is the work of Cady Noland. Noland's instal-
lation of columns of Budweiser cans in a room decorated with depictions of
violence is an example of images of the mass media and mass consumption
being used to challenge traditional notions of consumerism and pop cul-
ture.'24 Post-modern art, like Modernism before it, is atypical in the art his-
tory continuum because it does not use nature as a referent, rather it looks to a
"closed system of fabricated signs,"'" reflected in consumer products, pop
icons, media images, and contemporary (copyrighted) works of art. It is through
119. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 1.
120. BERNICE ROSE, ALLEGORIES OF MODERNISM: CONTEMPORARY DRAWINGS 1 (1992) (exhi-
bition brochure).
121. Ames, supra note 1, at 1480.
122. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
123. See id.
124. See McEvilley, supra note 57, at 100.
125. John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 13
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 111 (1988).
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the use of these familiar images that post-modem art strives to redeem the mean-
ing of commonplace words, philosophies, and politics.' 26 By employing such
unusual strategies, the post-modem artist pushes the envelope of traditional no-
tions of art by seeking "unheard of revolutionary forms of expression and sen-
sation, going that one final step beyond which it is impossible to go."'" Thus,
the incentive for the post-modem creation is in questioning art to the extreme. It
is a competition between artists. Each artist tries to go one step farther than the
other in redefining art. This type of art may not lead to museum masterpiec-
es,' and it may not even sell, but economic incentives are not what fuel the
post-modem artist. Stretching the limits of what is art is what motivates post-
modem creation.
VIII. UTILITARiAN OBJECTS AND THE ROLE OF INTENT
A. DEFINTON OF UTILITARIAN OBJECTS
The treatment of utilitarian objects 9 by courts also demonstrates how judg-
es often fail to evaluate works by the objective standards that the Copyright Act
mandates. This treatment may shed some light on what could potentially happen
if a judge were faced with evaluating a piece of Conceptual art. As such, the role
artistic intent plays in granting copyright protection to utilitarian object will be
examined. Judges have mistakenly considered intent in determining whether a
utilitarian item is worthy of copyright protection. Allowing intent to play such a
role in the determination of copyrightability would radically change the copyright
law and would lead to arbitrary decisions. The arbitrary results and aesthetic
judgments by fact finders that result from such a system being applied to util-
itarian designs are the same type of problems that would result if the Copyright
Act were to extend protection to artistic ideas.
Copyright protection is granted to the applied arts but not to works of indus-
trial design. Courts therefore must establish what is an original creation, and if
the work is useful, whether it is protected applied art or industrial design.' It
is in making these determinations that judges sometimes inject their own subjec-
126. GARDNER, supra note 4, at 106.
127. Id. at 14.
128. See Smith, supra note 23, at 264.
129. The Copyright Act defines a useful article as, "an article having intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An article that is
normally a part of a useful article is considered a 'useful article."' 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
'Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' include two-dimensional and three-dimen-
sional works of fine... and applied art .... Such works shall include works of artistic
craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are con-
cerned; the design of a useful article ... shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
Id. existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
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tive evaluations into the process.
B. PHYSICAL SEPARABILITY TEST IN MAZER V. STEIN
The first test courts used to determine whether a work is applied art or indus-
trial design was the physical separability test. Functional components of industri-
al design, no matter how artistically designed, have been denied copyright pro-
tection unless they are physically separable from the useful article.'3' In Mazer
v. Stein' the court granted copyright protection to lamp bases in the shape of
dancers, holding that the statuettes that made up the bases were physically sepa-
rable from the lamp. Because the statuettes could stand alone as works of art,
apart from the lighting fixture, they were granted copyright protection.
If the design is merged into the useful article as in the case of a modem
streamlined chair, there is no physical separability.'33 Yet, if one were to make
the frame of the chair separately as a modem sculpture and then weld the seat
onto it, there would arguably be physical separability and therefore protection.
C. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MODERN DESIGNS IN ESQUIRE, INC. V. RINGER
Despite Justice Reed's pronouncements in Mazer that, "[i]ndividual perception
of the beautiful is too varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid conception of
art,"'34 the physical separability requirement discriminates against modem de-
signs. 3 Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer'36 also involved an artistically designed lamp.
Unlike Mazer, the lamp in Esquire was a modem design. The court denied copy-
right protection holding that the aesthetic elements of the modem lamp were not
separable from its utilitarian nature. 3 7 The court stated that copyright protec-
tion is not extended "when all the design elements ... are directly related to the
function of the article.""'3 Although the district court found that to deny protec-
tion to this modem lamp design would give protection to works of traditional art
over modem designs,'39 the Court of Appeals argued that this discrimination
against modem designs is an "unintentional disproportionate impact on one style
of artistic expression."''
131. Id. at 318.
132. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
133. See GOLDSTFiN, supra note 6, at § 2.5.3.
134. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214.
135. DuBoff, supra note 130, at 314.
136. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 798.
139. Id. at 799.
140. Id. at 805. The court also stated that denying copyright protection for industrial designs was
rooted in administrative efficiency, rather than aesthetic discrimination. Copyrightability of utilitarian
design, whether separable or not, would lead to widespread copyrightability of industrial designs such
as planes, subways, and bathtubs. There would be no end in sight. Id. at 801.
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D. OvERVIEw OF CONCEPTUAL SEPARABILITY
Because physical separability can lead to such arbitrary results, some courts
began to use the standard of conceptual separability. Professor Paul Goldstein of
Stanford University defines conceptual separability by stating that, "a pictorial,
graphic or sculptural feature incorporated in the design of a useful article is
conceptually separable if it can stand on its own as a work of art traditionally
conceived, and if the useful article in which it is embodied would be equally
useful without it."'4 Under this definition, the lamp base in Mazer would still
be useful if the sculptural attachment were detached, but the modem chair would
not be useful if the cushion were detached from the frame. Thus, the more tradi-
tional lamp would be granted protection, while the modem design of the chair
would be denied protection. As such, conceptual separability, like physical sepa-
rability, has caused much concern over aesthetic considerations in that it has a
discriminatory effect against modem designs. 42
E. CONCEPTUAL SEPARABILITY AND DESIGNER'S INTENT IN BRANDIR V. CASCADE
PACIFIC LUMBER
Allowing an artist's intent to be instrumental in the determination of copyright
protection can lead to arbitrary results and unworkable standards. In Brandir
International v. Cascade Pacific Lumber,'43 the court considered a bike rack,
originating in a minimalist sculpture of wire tubing. The court employed the
conceptual separability standard, a different approach than the court in Esquire.
Judge Oakes considered whether "the design elements can be identified as re-
flecting the designer's judgment exercised independently of functional influenc-
es."'" This independent artistic test focuses on the circumstances and subjec-
tive intent of the artist and takes the process of creation into consideration. The
court decided whether the artistic elements of the work in question were signifi-
cantly influenced by functional considerations.'4 The artist's intent of creating
a bike rack, not a sculpture, was instrumental in the defeat of copyright protec-
tion in Brandir.'" This is significant because the court allowed intent to defeat
a claim of protection. 47 This may lead to the conclusion that intent should also
be allowed to establish a claim of protection. The notion of allowing creative in-
141. Id.
142. James H. Carter, They Know It When They See It: Copyright and Aesthetics in the Second
Circuit, 65 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 773, 788 (1991).
143. Brandir International v. Cascade Pacific Lumber, 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
144. Id. at 1145.
145. Brandir, 834 F.2d 1142. But see Esquire, 591 F.2d at 800. Esquire argued thai it designed its
fixture with the sole intent of creating modem sculpture. The court did not give this argument much
credence.
146. Brandir, 834 F.2d 1142.
147. An artist's intent is not confined just to questions of utilitarian design. In Batlin, the court
evaluated the artist's reasons for the variations in his copy of an Uncle Sam bank in a different medi-
um. L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (copyright denied due, in part,
to variations inspired by economic considerations, not creative considerations).
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tent to play a role in decisions of copyright protection would radically change the
face of copyright law.
Considering the artist's intent in cases of industrial design could have poten-
tial implications for the Conceptual artist. If Marcel Duchamp designed his bottle
rack instead of using a pre-existing item, which he termed "ready-mades," he
could potentially get copyright protection under this analysis by stating that his
intent was to create a sculpture, even though the bottle rack's function and aes-
thetics were fused. This type of analysis would leave the door open to designers
feigning artistic intent and would potentially flood the copyright office with work
that they specifically sought to avoid." s Thus, extending copyright protection to
conceptual art would lead to arbitrary judgments based on whether an artist's
intent is genuine. It would lead to huge administrative problems in determining
which works had an underlying bona fide artistic purpose. Judges may then have
to interject their own subjective standards in determining what ideas are truly
original and what are not. Copyrightability could turn on the personal experienc-
es of the fact finder. One judge could consider an idea original while another
could consider it commonplace. Because ideas are amorphous and intangible, it
would be a logistical problem to register such mental creations. These types of
administrative problems and arbitrary results would do nothing to further the
dissemination of works of art to the public. If anything they would discourage it.
IX. OVERVIEW OF APPROPRIATION ART
Appropriation art is another movement within post-modem art that has its
own distinct copyright problems. The appropriation artist lifts images from oth-
ers, sometimes in their entirety. Thus, many of these derivative works not only
lack originality, but they often infringe copyrighted works. Appropriation art
began in the nineteenth century with literary borrowing from existing works such
as James Joyce's Ulysses and T.S. Elliot's The Wasteland. By the twentieth
century, art began to incorporate images from the mass media and pop culture,
as well other works of art. Appropriation artists employ a wide range of tech-
niques, from incorporating a single element of a pre-existing work into a new
work (collage) to totally appropriating another image without alteration (appro-
priation). 49 Through collage and appropriation, the artist challenges the very
concepts of creativity, originality, and authorship, values upon which fine art has
traditionally been evaluated. 5 Artists utilize these techniques to comment on
our image-saturated society and to help us understand the process by which the
mass media has subsumed a huge portion of our daily lives. By juxtaposing
images and placing them in new contexts, the viewer is forced to exam how
different contexts can dramatically effect meaning.' An example of the star-
tling effects of recontextualization is Keith Haring's collage, Mob Flees at Pope
148. See supra note 140.
149. Ames, supra note 1, at 1478-1479.
150. Carlin, supra note 125, at 108.
151. Martha Buskirk, Appropriation Under the Gun, ART IN AMERICA, June 1992, at 29.
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Rally, which is comprised of a newspaper clipping of the Pope wiping tears from
his eyes with words from newspaper headlines pasted above the picture.'52
X. TENSION BETWEEN APPROPRIATION ART AND COPYRIGHT LAW
A. RESTRICTIVE GRANT OF FAIR USE PARODY DEFENSE: ROGERS V. KOONS
For appropriation art to work, an artist must borrow from an image that al-
ready exists as a familiar part of our collective social consciousness. In this way,
the artist can challenge ideas about ownership, originality, and meaning.'53 The
use of pre-existing contemporary images implicates three sections of the Copy-
right Act: the exclusive right to reproduce a work,'54 the exclusive right to pre-
pare derivative works,'55 and the exclusive right to display a work publicly.
56
In Bleistein Justice Holmes said that, "[o]thers are free to copy the original.
They are not free to copy the copy."' 57 By original, Holmes meant the referent
in nature. For the post-modem artist, the referent is not nature, but a self-con-
tained systems of contemporary images.1'5 The character of post-modem art,
and its emphasis on a different conception of the original, blurs Justice Holmes's
distinction of what one is allowed to copy.
A balance must be struck between protecting appropriation as an important
vehicle of social commentary and safeguarding the incentives of the original
artist. ' In Rogers v. Koons,6" the court tilted the scales in favor of the origi-
nal artist. To many, this case signaled the death knell of appropriation art."'6 In
Rogers, artist Jeff Koons appropriated an image of a couple with German Shep-
herd puppies from a photograph taken by Art Rogers. Koons made almost an
exact replica of Rogers' work in a garishly painted sculpture.'62 Koons's idea
was distinct from Rogers', although his expression was not. The purpose of
Koons's String of Puppies was to comment on society's obsession with reproduc-
ible images, while Rogers' purpose in his Puppies was to show an inoffensive,
charming scene."
Koons argued that his work was both a parody and legitimate social criticism.
To this end, the court applied the fair use test."6 The court considered the pur-
152. BARRY BLINDERMAN, KEITH HARJNG: FUTURE PRIMEVAL 22 (1990).
153. Ames, supra note I, at 1482.
154. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1988).
155. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988).
156. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1988).
157. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249.
158. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
159. Ames, supra note 1, at 1515.
160. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
161. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 25.
162. Id.
163. Cone, supra note 19, at 26.
164. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
Mhe fair use of a copyrighted work.., for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching ... , scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright In
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pose and character of Koons's use of Rogers' copyrighted photograph and incor-
porated a good faith standard into its formulation of the commercial purpose
test."° The court first determined that Koons's use was for commercial purpos-
es, rather than for the public interest."
Koons claimed parody as a defense, claiming that he was commenting on the
denigration of society caused by the glut of consumerism and mass reproduced
images. The court rejected the parody defense, stating that the "copied work
must be, at least in part, an object of parody, otherwise there would be no need
to conjure up the original."'67
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.," the Supreme Court stated that,
"[p]arody needs to mimic an original to make its point... "" The court
found that 2 Live Crew's parody of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman" was a
fair use even though it had taken the signature opening riff and opening words of
the Orbison song, together with the same style of refrain. 7' The court ex-
plained that
recognition is quotation of the original's most distinctive and memorable fea-
tures, which the parodist can be sure the audience will know. Once enough has
been taken to assure identification, how much more is reasonable will de-
pend ... on the extent to which the song's overriding purpose and character is
to parody the original or, in contrast, the likelihood that the parody may serve
as a market substitute for the original.1
7
'
What distinguishes Koons's sculpture from Campbell's song is that Koons
was not parodying Rogers' work, instead he was using it as a vehicle to com-
ment on society in general. Again, the court in Campbell gives us guidance on
post-modem art's claim of parody.
If... the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the
original composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or
to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in
borrowing from another's work diminishes accordingly ... , and other factors,
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is fair use the factors
to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commer-
cial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
Il
165. Koons ripped the copyright notice off of Rogers' postcard of Puppies, thus showing bad faith.
Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309.
166. Rogers, 960 F.2d 301.
167. Id. at 310.
168. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc., 114 S. C. 1164 (1994).
169. Id. at 1172.
170. Id. at 1164.
171. Id. at 1176.
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like the extent of commerciality loom larger."
In this sense, it seems that Koons shot himself in the foot by stating that his
work parodied society and not Art Rogers' photograph.'73 Nonetheless, this is
not necessarily true. At the heart of parody is, almost invariably, a well-known
expressive work. Koons's claim of parody also failed because Rogers' Pup-
pies is not a generally known image. As such, the general public would not be
able to understand this criticism."
The court in Rogers therefore dismissed appropriation as a legitimate form of
criticism. Possibly, Koons's criticism may have been too subtle for the court to
accept its legitimacy.'76
Koons's use also failed on the other three prongs of the fair use test. The
court found that Rogers' work was a creative work, that Koons copied the es-
sence of Rogers' work, and that the sculpture resulted in future harm to Rogers'
market. 7
B. ALTERNATIVES FOR THE APPROPRIATION ARTIST
Most appropriation art, like that of Koons, will fail the fair use test because
the artist usually sees the necessity to take the heart of the image or the image in
its entirety.'78 After Rogers, an appropriation artist now has four options: (1)
get permission from the original artist before using another's work; (2) pay a
licensing fee, (3) credit the original artist; or (4) make a distinction between an
appropriation artist's one time use of an image (as in a painting) and multiple
uses (as in prints or derivative works). 79
The problem with getting permission from the copyright holder of the original
source is that the holder may become a private censor who can chill the expres-
sion of the artist by limiting the sources of material on which an appropriation
artist can comment. 8° As with parody, some appropriation art possesses social
and political values that outweigh any economic loss to the copyright owner that
results from the parodist's use. Copyright owners face this type of economic loss
because some types of social criticism may be so biting that they will refuse to
grant a license out of fear that the parody exposes the owner to an undue amount
of criticism, and the parodist will, nevertheless, use the copyrighted image,
shielded by fair use.' As with parody, copyright holders may be unwilling to
172. Id. at 1172.
173. However, Justice Kennedy warns in his concurrence that since parody is an affirmative de-
fense, doubts as to whether something is a parody should be not be resolved in favor of the self-
proclaimed parodist. Id. at 1180.
174. Id. at 1174.
175. Rogers, 960 F.2d 301.
176. Buskirk, supra note 151, at 30.
177. Rogers, 960 F.2d 301.
178. Ames, supra note 1, at 1498.
179. Carlin, supra note 125, at 135.
180. Ames, supra note 1, at 1526.
181. GoLDSrEIN, supra note 6, at § 10.2.1.2.
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license their works to post-modem artists who ridicule the copyrighted work (or,
in the case of appropriation art, use it as an instrument of societal ridicule). 2
Nevertheless, parody is distinguishable from appropriation art. In Rogers, the
court stated that, "[u]nder our cases parody and satire are valued forms of criti-
cism, encouraged because this sort of criticism itself fosters the type of creativity
protected by the copyright law."' 3 Appropriation art, unlike parody, sometimes
lifts a whole image in its entirety and simply places it in a new context. This
type of use adds nothing original to the creative expression of the underlying
work. A parody, however, reproduces elements of the underlying work and incor-
porates these elements into a new, original work."8 4 In this way, a parodist con-
tributes something original to a work, which is encouraged under the Copyright
Act. An appropriation artist, on the other hand, characteristically fails to con-
tribute any original expression to the underlying work, which is contrary to the
Copyright Act's incentive structure.
Furthermore, in contrast to parodists, appropriation artists do not use well-
known works. Some argue that the willingness of courts to allow fair use for
parodies of well-known underlying works is overly restrictive in the context of
post-modem art.' Maybe courts should be less restrictive because parody's
goal is mocking, while art tries to make something of timeless value.' s Be-
cause appropriation artists comment on society in general, rather than on a spe-
cific work, the fair use standard that only applies if the underlying work is paro-
died is also considered by some to be overly restrictive."n
Appropriation artists may have some hope in a First Amendment defense
since much of their art functions as political commentary.' An example of
such art is Keith Haring's Reagan Slain by Hero Cop, 9 which is another col-
lage using newspaper clippings and a copyrighted wire service photograph. This
work is overt political commentary, and as unorthodox speech, it enriches public
discourse. Under a First Amendment defense, Reagan Slain By Hero Cop could
not be constrained in any way by the copyright holder. The appropriation artist
would be free to use another's work in whatever way he deemed appropriate.
This approach would lead to unlimited copying and would subsume the Copy-
182. Ames, supra note 1, at 1494.
183. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
184. GOLDSTEiN, supra note 6, at § 10.2.1.2.
185. Id. at 1501.
186. Carlin, supra note 125, at 125-126.
187. In Elsmere v. National Broadcasting Co. the court held that "Saturday Night Live's" skit
which included the song "I Love Sodom," sung to the tune of "I Love New York," was a fair use
parody even though it commented on New York society in general, in addition to the New York
jingle. The court went on to state that even if the song did not parody the "I Love New York" song,
such a finding would not preclude a finding of fair use. Elsmere v. National Broadcasting, 482 F.
Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff d, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980). This seems to be contrary to the Su-
preme Courts holding in Campbell. See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
188. Ames, supra note 1, at 1508.
189. BLINDRmAN, supra note 152, at 22.
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right Act." ° The Copyright Act is structured in such a way that an artist's in-
terest in the free flow of ideas is protected without having to rely on the uncon-
strained results of a First Amendment defense. The Copyright Act shares several
aspects of doctrinal consonance with the First Amendment's free flow of ideas.
The fair use exception for critical works and the protection of expression, as
opposed to ideas, assures the free flow of information, consistent with the First
Amendment.'9 ' The First Amendment defense alternative is thus unnecessary in
light of the current Copyright Act.
Another potential solution for appropriation artists is a fair use standard that
takes into account the unique constraints of the visual arts. Under one such view,
proposed by E. Kenly Ames, the appropriator must have used an appropriated
image in a work of visual art. A work of visual art is distinguished from a mass-
produced item. Jeff Koons's String of Puppies would be a work of visual art, but
posters of the statue would not be works of visual art. This requirement would
protect an artist's image from being marketed as consumer goods. Undoubtedly,
this kind of mass marketing would result in grave economic harm to the copy-
right owner that is distinguishable from the economic harm from the sale of a
one-of-a-kind appropriation piece. There would be a presumption that this kind
of limited edition work was for social commentary and no consideration would
be given to the commercial value of the work."9 The problem with this ap-
proach is that in today's art market, the amount of money an appropriation artist
could make from the sale of a one-of-a-kind piece may well rival the amount of
money to be made from mass marketed consumer goods.'93
The test for using an image would not be whether the observer recognized the
specific image used, but whether the observer would recognize the image as
being part of a particular genre. This would allow artists like Jeff Koons to use
images that are not well known, such as Art Rogers' Puppies. Appropriation
artists would then be allowed to draw on a wealth of images in our society, and
not just those that are so well known that they fall under the fair use parody
exception. 94 Yet, defining what is part of a particular genre would be difficult
to determine. It may likely require judges to make subjective, aesthetic judg-
ments of the type Justice Holmes believed had no place in copyright law.
The court would then consider the substantiality of the work taken, but would
not require that the secondary work directly criticize the underlying work. This
factor would operate in contrast to parody's requirement of direct criticism of the
underlying work. In this way, the unique ability of appropriation art to make
sweeping statements about society in general through the use of certain general-
ized images would be fostered.93 Nevertheless, a parodist combines original
190. Ames, supra note 1, at 1508-1509.
191. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at § 10.3.
192. Ames, supra note 1, at 1518-1519.
193. Although Jeff Koons's String of Puppies was not a one-of-a-kind piece, it was a limited edi-
tion. His three copies sold for a total of $367,000. Cone, supra note 19, at 25.
194. Ames, supra note 1, at 1519.
195. Id. at 1522.
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elements with the underlying work, thus adding to society's creative vocabulary.
If an appropriation artist does not comment directly on an underlying work, there
may be no need to add anything original to the underlying work. This would do
nothing to encourage new artistic expression, which is the driving force behind
the Copyright Act.
The copyright holder would have to demonstrate a substantial effect on their
market due to the appropriator's work; speculative art licenses would not be
enough. Ames argues that when a copyright holder claims lost licensing fees
when her work is parodied, such a claim is unreasonable because the copyright
owner would never have licensed the work in the first place. Even if an artist
licenses her work for derivative pieces, such as hats or shirts bearing a copy-
righted photograph, Ames believes that this should have no bearing on a copy-
right owner's claimed losses due to appropriation. A copyright holder could con-
sider how critical the appropriation piece is going to be and charge accordingly.
This type of private censorship could be discouraged by disallowing consider-
ation of potential licensing fees. Nonetheless, special consideration would be
given to the harm of markets for derivative works, which is a large part of the
economic incentive for original artists.'96
Finally, good faith would be judged not on the actions of the creator, but on
whether the secondary work should be encouraged.'97 Jeff Koons's act of rip-
ping the copyright warning off of Rogers' card would be disregarded, while the
societal importance of his message would be given precedence. The court in
Rogers found this behavior reprehensible and stated that such willful exploitation
of another's work does not benefit the public good.'98 Such bad faith totally
obscures any socially valuable message in the work itself. The work then con-
veys a message distinct from its valuable social commentary, that theft of
another's work is permissible.
Changing the Copyright Act to accommodate appropriation art is problematic
for other reasons as well. In Rogers the court stated that if an artist could avoid
copyright infringement by claiming artistic purpose, there would be no limit to
this defense."9 A good example of this is the work of Sherrie Levine. She ac-
tually took pictures from others and called them her own. Stealing other people's
art and attributing it to herself was her point. She was challenging the notions of
"originality, intention, and authorship."' ° Changing the copyright law to ac-
commodate appropriation art, as Ames suggests, could lead to a flood of this
type of abuse. Although there is potential social benefit to be gained from appro-
priation art, one should simply not profit from another's creative, copyrighted
expression by hiding under the guise of legitimate social commentary.
196. Think of all the Haring and Warhol merchandise on the market.
197. Ames, supra note 1, at 1518-1521.
198. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309.
199. Rogers, 960 F.2d 301.
200. Carlin, supra note 125, at 137.
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XI. CONCLUSION
It is the nature of post-modem art to stretch the limits on what is considered
art. If the Copyright Act were to accommodate post-modernism, it would have to
be continually re-written as artists redefine and rewrite the rules of creativity,
originality, and authorship. We are at a time where everything can be art, even
Duchamp's bottle rack. If art has no limits, should copyright have no limits?
Clearly, this is an unworkable proposition. The original incentives of the Copy-
right Act to encourage unique and original works20' would be seriously under-
mined.
The current Copyright Act fails to protect most works of post-modem art.
Yet, this is not the result of an intentional bias. Conceptual art and appropriation
art expand the definition of art in a manner that is almost limitless. A workable
statute, on the other hand, needs limits. Art needs to be limited by definition for
administrative purposes. Art also needs to be limited by definition so protection
has some meaning. If the Copyright Act were extended to the outer limits of
post-modem art, it could lead to everything being protected art, as in the case of
the copyrightability of ideas. Alternatively, it could lead to nothing being pro-
tected, as in the case of allowing appropriation artists to steal the work of others
so long as there is some artistic purpose. The Copyright Act imposes limits that
are broad, unbiased, and workable. These limits embrace the largest amount of
work possible without undermining the incentives of fostering new works of
original expression. Post-modem art, by definition, undermines original expres-
sion. Any laws that would accommodate this type of art would, therefore, un-
dermine the essence of the Copyright Act.
201. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 16.
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